11/17/2026

Incident Memory: Chronology of an Extortion-as-a-Service Attack (I)

Chronology of an Extortion-as-a-Service Attack (I) CyberCrime

A cyberattack rarely begins where companies expect it. And it involves more than compromised networks. It is also a stress test for those in charge and for existing processes. Especially when there is no emergency plan. Then many discussions revolve around responsibilities instead of the actual problem. Who picks up the phone at night? Who assesses the situation? Who has the nerve to make a hard cut? These questions take center stage. This is where it is decided whether a company stays able to act in a crisis. Technology is indispensable in incident response. But it only works fast enough if organization, communication and decision-making paths have been prepared.

A real case made this very clear. At one company, first indications pointed to an active attack. The recommendation was unambiguous: disconnect from the internet to interrupt the attackers’ ongoing activities. Yet it took almost three hours before that decision was actually made. Not because the IT team sat idle. Quite the opposite: the administrators responded with commitment and tried to find a suitable partner to help with the crisis. After the very first phone call, it was clear that the attack was still in progress. The problem lay elsewhere. There was no clear escalation plan, no reliable emergency structure and no one who could make a decision right away. And because nobody had the phone number of the decision-makers, the police actually had to pay a visit and, quite literally, ring the responsible person out of bed.

Negotiating and Buying Time

Even at this early stage, it was clear that besides incident handling, another partner was needed: one specialized in negotiating with extortionists. The attackers had not encrypted anything. They had siphoned off data. Once the network connection was cut and the perpetrators could no longer exfiltrate further data, the extortion began. The attackers threatened to publish the critical data and set a deadline for making contact. The goal was not simply to reduce a possible ransom payment. What mattered was buying time: time to understand the situation, assess the data that had leaked and regain control.

Such negotiations are not a side job for a crisis. Even the first message to an extortion group has a strong influence on what follows. That takes specialists who know the tactics, dynamics and risks of this kind of communication. The CSIRT has long worked in a relationship of trust with Delta Crisis. The Swiss consultancy specializes in crisis management and negotiation. The negotiators managed to build trust and win the affected company considerably more time. The cybercriminals also shared a file listing all the exfiltrated data. The Excel spreadsheet held one million entries, which now had to be reviewed and prioritized. Based on that assessment, the company could plan measures to limit the damage.

As the negotiations went on, the cyber insurer played an inglorious role. Its coverage only included possible ransom payments, not the costs of talking to the extortionists. The specialists from Delta Crisis had to withdraw from the negotiations. And this despite the fact that law enforcement had classified the group as particularly difficult. The insurer’s employee came to realize this too, after nearly destroying the negotiators’ entire success with just two messages. Companies should therefore check carefully before an attack what their policy actually covers. Insurance should cover not only ransom payments, but also crisis negotiation, forensics, communication and legal advice.

From Incident to Warning Signal

The incident also showed how important a trusting relationship with law enforcement is. It helped complete the picture of the attack and share findings. For the first time, the G DATA CSIRT was able to map the full attack chain from initial access to extortion. G DATA shared this information with the authorities and other IT security companies, so that ongoing attacks on other companies could be interrupted at an earlier stage. Those who report an incident and share information in a controlled way strengthen not only their own recovery. A single incident became a warning signal for other companies.

The involvement of the management also showed how important prepared emergency contacts are. After the initial containment, the point was not simply to “switch everything back on.” The company had to remain operational without reopening its attack surface. That required a controlled emergency operation and clear decisions. Together with the management and the IT admins, the rollout of G DATA MXDR was pushed through without delay. This put the entire IT infrastructure under monitoring. Thanks to close cooperation between the G DATA CSIRT and the G DATA SOC, the case-specific indicators of compromise were fed in immediately and all connected systems were checked.

Conclusion: Incident Response Is Not Decided in the Server Room Alone

The case shows very concretely that incident response is not a purely IT task. Technical analysis is central, but it needs an organization that enables decisions. It demands leadership that can put risks in perspective. It needs communication that reduces pressure instead of amplifying chaos. And in an emergency, it needs strong partnerships that already exist.

In the second part of this post, we present aspects of the forensic analysis and show how the perpetrators operated.


Stefan Karpenstein

Stefan Karpenstein

Public Relations Manager


Share Article

AI translated